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Abstract 
Refugees and social capital: Evidence from Northern Lebanon* 
 
 
Despite numerous studies on the social and political impact of refugees in Europe, 
we have very little systematic evidence on the impact of refugee settlement on 
social cohesion in the developing world. Using data gathered in Northern Lebanon, 
we show that increased salience of the "refugee crisis" decreases natives' trust and 
prosocial preferences toward refugees, suggesting a negative impact of mass refu-
gee settlement. However, this negative impact is driven exclusively by respond-
ents with no individual exposure to refugees. In fact, despite concerns that refu-
gee settlements may result in local conflict, we find that individual proximity to 
refugees is positively correlated with trust towards refugees, and that proximity 
has a positive spillover effect on social capital towards other migrants. This im-
plies that, while the refugee crisis may have had a negative impact on social cohe-
sion, this negative impact is mitigated in areas where natives are in contact with 
refugees. 
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Introduction
While the recent “refugee crisis” has focused attention on the impact of migrants
on European societies, on a global scale, a large majority of displaced individ-
uals are resettled either permanently or temporarily in the developing countries
neighboring areas of conflict. In fact, the top five hosting countries are all middle
or low-income countries—Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran and Uganda—and to-
gether they host nearly one third of all refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Despite the fact
that only a small proportion of refugees are hosted in Europe or other developed
countries and that these countries are arguably less susceptible to shocks given
relatively strong political and social institutions, there is very little research on
the impact of refugee settlement in the middle and low income countries that
have been most affected by the refugee crisis.1
In this paper, we provide evidence on the social and political impact of refugee
settlement on the host country using original survey data gathered from a repre-
sentative sample in Northern Lebanon. Lebanon constitutes an ideal setting in
which to study the impact of mass refugee settlement: The Syrian civil war has
resulted in a large inflow of refugees from a neighboring country, and Lebanon is
currently hosting a refugee population that represents about twenty-five percent
of its population. Added to this, Lebanon has an exceptionally ethnically and re-
ligiously diverse population, with a history of ethnic conflict, political strife and
civil war. Therefore, Lebanon captures two important features of refugee mi-
gration in developing countries that are different from the developed world: (1)
incoming refugees may have an initial social distance that is closer to the native
population, and (2) initial political and social institutions may be less robust.
Lastly, Lebanon is rather unique in its approach to refugee settlement. Rather
than restricting refugees to large, isolated camps (the approach taken in Turkey
and Jordan) Lebanon banned the construction of permanent refugee shelters and
allowed refugees to settle among the general population, resulting in relatively
close proximity between the native and refugee populations. This allows us to
study both the global impact of mass refugee migration on social cohesion, and
1See for example Steinmayr (2006) for outcomes ranging from prejudice to voting behavior
and social capital in Austria, and Hangartner et al. (2019) for evidence from Greece.
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the local impact of increased exposure to refugees.
We contribute to the understanding of the social and political impact of
refugee settlement in developing countries by studying the impact of refugee set-
tlement on prosocial behavior such as trust, altruism, cooperation and reciprocity
between social groups. We focus on social capital, which is linked to political be-
havior (see Putnam, 1994), rather than focusing on voting behavior directly since
the political process in Lebanon is heavily sectarian. Importantly, while previous
papers have focused on the effect of migrants on the native population, an influx
of refugees may have significant spillover effects on the social fabric of the host-
ing country beyond the narrow channel of native-refugee relations. Therefore,
we consider the impact of the refugee crisis on social capital between three rele-
vant social groups: the native population (Lebanese), the new refugee population
(Syrians), and an established migrant population (Palestinians).
We explore two channels through which proximity to new refugees impacts
social capital: a “global” impact as the country as a whole reacts to the challenge
of settling new refugees, and a “local” impact as individuals react to an influx
of refugees in their local communities. Despite the low social distance between
Lebanese natives and Syrian refugees, relative to refugees in the EU, we hypothe-
size that the global impact of the refugee crisis will negatively affect social capital
towards refugees. However, the direction of the local impact is unclear: On one
hand, a large literature within social psychology has established that personal
contact can lead to a decrease in discrimination of out-group individuals (All-
port, 1954). On the other hand, a large literature in economics and political
science has established that polarized ethnic diversity can lead to inter-group
conflict as groups compete over scarce resources (Ray and Esteban, 2017). Addi-
tionally, the direction of the spillover impact of the refugee crisis on social capital
between Lebanese and Palestinians is unclear: Social capital towards new and
established refugees may be positively linked, as the two groups are implicitly
associated through their joint refugee status. However, it may also be the case
that the introduction of a new refugee group may reduce the perceived social
distance between native Lebanese and the established Palestinian refugees.
As expected, we find that respondents that are primed with the refugee crisis
respond by reporting lower levels of social capital towards Syrian refugees, sug-
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gesting a negative global impact of the refugee crisis on social capital. However,
we also consider the interaction between the local and global effects—while these
findings are only suggestive, the results are surprisingly stark: we find that the
priming effect on social capital is driven entirely by respondents with no local
exposure to refugees.
We also find that, in contrast to our prior expectations, proximity to refugees
is positively related to natives’ reported measures of trust and prosocial prefer-
ences towards refugees. That is, despite reports of conflict between natives and
Syrian refugees in areas of co-habitation (e.g. Bank, 2013, UNDP, 2017), we find
that the positive effect of contact dominates conflict. Lastly, the evidence sug-
gests proximity to recent refugees has a positive spillover effect on other migrant
groups: Lebanese natives in closer proximity to Syrian refugees also report higher
levels of social capital towards Palestinian refugees.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the refugee crisis is several mean-
ingful ways. Most importantly, our paper provides novel systematic evidence
on the social and political impact of the refugee crisis in a developing country
with a history of ethnic and sectarian conflict. We show that, in isolation, the
refugee crisis appears to have a negative impact on social capital, similar to evi-
dence from Europe (Hangartner et al., 2019). However, the positive relationship
between proximity to refugees and social capital indicates that, in contrast to
mixed evidence from Europe (see Edo et al., 2018 for a review), the positive im-
pact of contact dominates conflict. Moreover, we provide novel evidence on the
spillover effect of the refugee crisis on social cohesion between natives and exist-
ing migrant groups. We find little evidence of negative spillovers of the refugee
crisis on existing migrant groups; instead, proximity to Syrian refugees is posi-
tively correlated with social capital towards Palestinians. Overall, this suggest
that while developing countries may have less stable political and social institu-
tions, the potential negative impact of a refugee crisis is mitigated a close physical
proximity to refugees, which results in a higher degree of positive contact.
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1 Design Overview
In the following section, we present a short overview of our design (full details
can be found in our pre-analysis plan: https://egap.org/registration/3022), and
present our empirical hypotheses. Our data consists of survey responses from
1,000 Lebanese respondents from districts in the immediate north of Lebanon
(see Figure 1): Akkar, Hermel and north-eastern Baalbek. First, we employed a
multi-stage random sampling method to gain a representative sample of Northern
Lebanon’s Lebanese resident population. Our primary sampling units (PSUs)
were 1km x 1km grid cells, and within each randomly selected PSU, we recruited
a number of respondents proportional to the number of inhabitants within the
grid.
Figure 1: Sampling area
Notes: The map plots the sampling area, where squares denote
PSUs. Red squares were dropped due to security reasons, lack of
accessibility or measurement error. Green squares denote popu-
lated PSUs.
To measure our main outcome, social capital, we used a proxy questionnaire
for four well-established experimental measures: trust, reciprocity, altruism and
cooperation. While we did not incentivize subject responses, we based our survey
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on Falk et al. (2016), who establish a strong correlation between their question-
naire and standard experimental games (see questions 31-34 in the survey for
details). Our primary measure of social capital is the pseudo-experimental mea-
sure of trust, which is the most commonly used proxy for social capital. However,
we also consider a composite metric of social capital that consists of a weighted
sum of the four measures (we follow the technique outlined in Anderson (2008)
to construct the composite index), and results for the two measures are largely
comparable.
Additionally, our survey relied on two primes. First, we vary the identity of
the recipient in the pseudo-experimental games between Syrian, Lebanese and
Palestinian. We elicit responses from respondents for all three identities. How-
ever, we vary the order of the recipient identity, and for certain empirical tests we
only use responses from the first identity to avoid order effects (we pre-registered
all analyses).
Second, to identify the global impact of the refugee crisis, we primed half of
the respondents to think about the refugee crisis by asking them the following
questions:
Currently, Lebanon is hosting over one million refugees from Syria...
1. How have you and your family been personally affected by the
refugee crisis?
2. How do you think Lebanon as a whole has been affected by the
refugee crisis?
3. Do you support Lebanons response to the refugee crisis?
Lastly, we consider the local impact of the refugee crisis by measuring prox-
imity to refugees. As a proxy for local exposure, we geocode the location of all
temporary refugee settlements, and measure the distance between the respon-
dent’s residence and the nearest settlement. While this is an imperfect measure
of local exposure, logically, individuals who are closer to settlements will be more
exposed to refugees (we verify that it is correlated with self-reported contact with
refugees). Additionally, unlike self-reported measures of contact, it is exogenous
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to the day-to-day behavioral choices of respondents.2
Since refugee settlement is an endogenous choice, we address potential con-
founds that may influence refugee settlement as well as social capital. In partic-
ular, we consider the following confounds:
1. Wealth—pre-treatment economic wealth of a given PSU measured using
nighttime satellite images.
2. Accessibility—pre-treatment accessibility using the distance to roads and
waterways of a given PSU.
3. Density—pre-treatment population density estimates of a given PSU.
In addition, we control for the individual variables age, gender, Muslim (Syrian
refugees are primarily Muslim)—variables that may not be affected by the treat-
ment, but that may correlate with measures of social capital—and a self-reported
measure of nationalism.
Despite controlling for obvious confounds, Syrian refugee settlement in Lebanon
is an endogenous process, which raises concerns regarding whether our correla-
tional analysis indicates a causal relationship. Therefore, we also conduct an IV
analysis using altitude as an instrument. Notably, using detailed data from UN-
HCR, we document that Syrian refugees did not settle in the mountainous terrain
of Mount Lebanon, while the lower parts of the country were heavily settled (see
Figures 2 and 3 in our PAP for more detail). We believe this is primarily due to
the difficulty of constructing suitable temporary shelter at higher altitudes, where
winters are quite severe—in fact, the availability of cheap and suitable housing
the main factor driving refugees’ choice of location (UN-Habitat and UNHCR,
2018). This has resulted in local-level variation in refugee settlement patterns in
Northern Lebanon and, importantly, there are reasons to believe that altitude has
no direct effect on social capital once we control for the aforementioned potential
confounds.3
2That is, respondents with lower levels of trust towards refugees may actively avoid contact
with refugees. However, given rather low mobility in Lebanon, it does not seem likely that a
significant number of Lebanese individuals changed residences to avoid refugees.
3There are important channels that may cause attitudes towards refugees to be different
in mountainous areas: they are generally less populated, less accessible, less wealthy and,
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1.1 Hypotheses
Drawing on our sample of Northern Lebanese residents, we test several hypothe-
ses regarding the impact of refugee settlement on social capital. First, we con-
sider the global impact of the refugee crisis on the social structure of Lebanon.
Based on the local political and social dialogue regarding the refugee “crisis” and
studies documenting a negative impact of the refugee crisis on social attitudes
towards refugees and voting behavior in Europe (Hangartner et al., 2019), despite
the relatively low social distance between Lebanese natives and Syrian refugees
we hypothesize a negative impact of priming the refugee crisis on social capital
towards Syrian refugees:
Hypothesis 1. Native out-group trust towards the Syrian recipient is lower for
respondents primed with the refugee crisis. [H1]
Likewise, since the refugee crisis may negatively impact social capital towards
all refugees, we expect there to be a negative impact of the prime on social capital
towards Palestinian refugees due to their refugee status.
Hypothesis 2. Lebanese trust towards the Palestinian recipient is lower for
respondents primed with the refugee crisis. [H2]
Next, we consider the local impact of proximity to Syrian refugees on so-
cial capital. We hypothesize that social capital is impacted by proximity to
new refugees through two channels: contact and conflict. First, a large litera-
ture within social psychology has established that personal contact can lead to
a decrease in discrimination of out-group individuals (Allport, 1954). Given a
closer physical proximity to refugees, natives living close to refugee settlements
arguably have a greater degree of contact with refugees, which would have a pos-
itive effect on trust. Second, a large literature in economics and political science
has established that polarized ethnic diversity can lead to inter-group conflict as
groups compete over scarce resources (Ray and Esteban, 2017). Given the high
ethnic diversity of communities hosting refugee populations, combined with the
in Lebanon, less Muslim. However, these are precisely the confounds that we control for—
therefore, the identifying assumption is that altitude is conditionally independent from attitudes
towards refugees.
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increased economic pressures of an increased population, the conflict mechanism
predicts a negative impact of proximity on trust. Due to strong anecdotal evi-
dence of social conflict between natives and refugees in Northern Lebanon (see
Bank, 2013 and UNDP, 2017), in the balance, we expect the conflict mechanism
to dominate the contact mechanism:
Hypothesis 3. Lebanese trust towards the Syrian recipient is decreasing in prox-
imity to refugees. [H3]
Related, the conflict hypothesis would point to a hardening of in-group soli-
darity, which would have a positive impact on native’s in-group social capital:
Hypothesis 4. Lebanese in-group trust is increasing in proximity to refugees.
[H4]
Lastly, an influx of new refugees may impact the relationship between the
native population and established refugee/migrant groups. Again, we hypothesize
that there are two potential channels of impact: First, social capital towards
new and established refugees may be positively linked, as the two groups are
implicitly associated through their joint refugee status. Second, the relative social
status of established refugee groups may be negatively linked with new refugees,
as the introduction of a new group may reduce the perceived social distance
between natives and the established refugees. On the balance, we expect the
joint association effect to dominate:
Hypothesis 5. Lebanese social capital towards both refugee groups is positively
correlated, and Lebanese trust towards the Palestinian recipient is decreasing in
proximity to Syrian refugees.4[H5]
Additionally, to explore mechanisms in greater detail and to validate our
measure of proximity, we also elicit the following measures of conflict and contact
from the Lebanese respondents:
4In contrast to Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees are constrained to reside in designated
refugee camps, and there is only one Palestinian refugee camp in our sampling area, compared
to hundreds of Syrian temporary refugee camps. This limits exposure to Palestinian refugees
and, importantly, means that proximity to Syrian refugee settlements does not imply proximity
to Palestinian refugees.
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1. Resource competition [Economic]: Refugee settlement may increase
competition over local governmental and economic resources, which may
decrease social capital toward Syrians. We measure resource competition
using an additive index (see question 39 in the survey).
2. Cultural threat [Psychological]: Refugee settlement may increase per-
ceived cultural threat thereby reducing social capital toward Syrians. We
measure cultural threat using a feeling thermometer toward Syrians (see
question 42 in the survey).
3. Contact [Psychological]: Refugee settlement may increase contact be-
tween Syrians and Lebanese thereby increasing social capital toward Syri-
ans. We measure contact using a standard measure (see question 40 in the
survey).
2 Analysis and Results
In this section, we detail the main findings of the study. While most of the
analysis presented in this section directly follows our pre-registered analysis plan,
we also report other results when it is logical to do so and clearly label these
results as ex-post.
2.1 Global Impact: Priming Experiment
We first provide evidence on the global impact of the refugee crisis on social
cohesion by reporting the results of the priming experiment. As preregistered,
we only consider data from the first recipient identity to avoid order effects;
however, this severely limits our sample size. As show in Figure 2, Lebanese
respondents that are primed with the refugee crisis on average report lower levels
of the prosocial measures with a Syrian recipient—while the difference in trust is
not statistically significant (p-value of 0.3201), the p-value for the social capital
index is 0.0596.
This result suggests that, comparable to results from the EU, the perceived
impact of the refugee crisis on the native society may contribute to lower levels
10
Figure 2: Priming: Lebanese Respondents
(a) Syrian recipients
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(b) Palestinian recipients
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Notes: Following our pre-registered analysis plan, we only include
answers from the first identity-category of each respondent.
of social capital between natives and new refugees. We do not, however, see any
evidence of a spillover effect to Palestinian refugees (H2).
Result 1. [H1 and H2] A higher degree of salience of the refugee crisis causes a
lower degree of social capital towards Syrian refugees (H1), but does not impact
social capital towards Palestinian refugees (H2).
2.1.1 Interaction of proximity and priming
Next, we explore whether the priming has heterogeneous effects as a function of
exposure to refugees—note that this analysis was not in our pre-registered anal-
ysis plan and should therefore be considered as suggestive. Given our findings,
however, it is a natural extension of our analysis and we are able to utilize a pre-
registered measure of exposure. Specifically, we pre-registered an altitude cutoff,
below which we classify respondents as exposed to refugees, and above which we
classify respondents as not exposed.
Looking at Figure 3, we see that the negative impact of priming the refugee
crisis on social capital towards Syrian refugees seems to be driven entirely by
respondents who are not exposed to refugees. Additionally, while not statisti-
cally significant, it is interesting to note that all measures of social capital to-
wards Palestinian refugees are lower for primed respondents with no proximity
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to refugees (see Figure 3), consistent with the hypothesis of a positive correlation
between social capital towards Syrian and Palestinian refugees.
Figure 3: The impact of refugee proximity on refugee
crisis prime (Syrian recipient)
(a) Not exposed to refugees.
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(b) Exposed to refugees.
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Figure 4: The impact of refugee proximity on refugee
crisis prime (Palestinian recipient)
(a) Not exposed to refugees
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(b) Exposed to refugees
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2.2 Local Impact: Proximity to Refugees
Next, we provide evidence on the local impact of the refugee crisis on social cohe-
sion by reporting our estimated effect of proximity to refugees on social capital.
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As discussed above, we consider three different models here: a basic correla-
tion coefficient, a linear model that controls for potential confounders, and lastly
our pre-registered IV model using altitude as an instrument for proximity. We
present the results for the social capital index; however, the results are equivalent
for trust (see Table 2 in the Appendix).
In a first step, we measure the unconditional correlation between proximity
to refugees and social capital, proxied by the distance to the nearest refugee
settlement. Contrary to our pre-registered hypothesis, the correlation between
distance (10 km) and social capital is negative (-0.0663, p-value of 0.001), imply-
ing that individuals with a higher degree of proximity to Syrian refugees report
higher levels of social capital for Syrian recipients. This suggests that, in the case
of proximity, the conflict effect is dominated by the contact effect.
In a second step, we control for the pre-treatment confounders we highlight
in our design section, namely wealth, accessibility, density, age and gender. The
results are reported in Table 1, column 2. Here we see that the coefficient on
the distance to the nearest refugee shelter remains negative (-0.0356, p-value of
0.041), although the magnitude of the coefficient decreases relative to the simple
correlation coefficient.
In a third step, we employ our IV approach. First, the results of the first stage
of our 2SLS estimation show a significant and large positive correlation between
altitude and distance to the nearest refugee settlement (0.648, first-stage F-stat
of 248.37). As seen in column (2) of Table 1, the estimated impact of the distance
to the nearest refugee shelter on the social capital index remains negative and of
similar size to the coefficient of the OLS regression (-0.0438, p-value of 0.058).
Column (3) shows that the result is robust to controlling for self-reported religion
(grouped by Muslim/Not Muslim) and nationalism, showing that the result is not
driven by a different religious composition at higher altitudes (this was not our
pre-registered model specification, but we include the additional model since it
is a natural robustness concern).
On the balance, the evidence from our three models supports the finding of a
positive impact of proximity to refugees on social capital towards refugees.
Result 2. [H3] The results of our analysis point towards a positive causal impact
of proximity to refugees on native’s social capital towards refugees, suggesting that,
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Table 1: Impact of proximity on social capital index
Recipient Syrian Palestinian Lebanese
(1) (2) (3) (4)∗ (5∗)
SC Index OLS IV IV OLS OLS
Distance -0.0356∗∗ -0.0438∗ -0.0727∗∗ -0.361∗∗ -0.0182
(10 km) (0.0174) (0.0231) (0.0302) (0.0159) (0.155)
Wealth 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(0.00351) (0.00354) (0.00359) (0.00348) (0.00316)
Accessibility 0.0789 0.0710 0.0565 0.116 0.119∗∗
(0.0653) (0.0669) (0.0729) (0.0648) (0.0588)
Density 0.00526 0.00470 -0.00196 0.00387 -0.0134
(0.00804) (0.00809) (0.00801) (0.00798) (0.00725)
Age -0.00484∗∗∗ -0.00479∗∗ -0.00297 -0.00473∗∗ -0.00544∗∗∗
(0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00168)
Female 0.161∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0511) (0.0519) (0.0472)
Muslim - - 0.486∗∗∗ - -
(0.0726)
Nationalism - - 0.0168 - -
(0.0560)
N 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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contrary to our ex-ante prior, the contact effect outweighs the conflict effect.
Additionally, we consider the impact of proximity to refugees on Lebanese
respondent’s reported in-group social capital. Across all regression models, we
find no evidence of a causal effect of proximity on native’s in-group social capital.
Result 3. [H4] We find no evidence that native’s in-group social capital is af-
fected by proximity to new refugees.
Lastly, column (4) of Table 1 shows that proximity to Syrian refugees has
a positive impact on native’s social capital towards Palestinian refugees. This
suggests a positive link between Lebanese respondent’s social capital towards
Syrian and Palestinian refugees, rather than a negative link due to divergent
relative status.
Result 4. [H5] We find that native’s social capital towards new refugees and pre-
existing migrant communities is positively linked, suggesting that both out-groups
share a joint social status.
2.2.1 Mechanisms
We also explore the mechanisms involved in the positive effect of proximity to
refugees on native’s social capital towards refugees. As seen in Figure 5, proximity
to refugees is, unsurprisingly, correlated with higher contact.
Figure 5: Mechanisms: Social capital and proximity
●
●
●
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Factors associated with the conflict mechanism, however, are not positively
correlated with proximity. Proximity is not positively correlated with a feeling
of cultural threat and respondents with a higher degree of proximity to refugees
are less likely to experience high degrees of resource competition, due either
to endogenous selection of refugees in areas with high economic activity and
government resources, or due to the fact that refugees result in a higher degree
of economic activity and a greater allocation of government resources.
These findings further suggest that the correlation between proximity and
social capital is due to the contact effect dominating the conflict effect: a higher
degree of proximity to Syrian refugees results in a greater degree of contact, and
our data show that, rather than increasing economic and cultural conflict, this
contact results in a positive impact on social capital between natives and refugees
with positive spillovers to other migrant communities.
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A Supplementary Appendix
A.1 Additional Statistical Tables
Table 2: Impact of proximity on trust (amount sent)
Recipient Syrian Palestinian Lebanese
(1) (2) (3) (4)∗ (5∗)
Trust OLS IV IV OLS OLS
Distance -0.167∗∗ -0.176∗ -0.254∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.0227
(10km) (0.0672) (0.0949) (0.103) (0.0631) (0.0764)
Wealth 0.0391∗ 0.0388∗ 0.0432∗∗ 0.0357∗ 0.0440∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0175)
Accessibility 0.493 0.485 0.492 0.538∗ 0.478
(0.317) (0.325) (0.315) (0.324) (0.292)
Density 0.0400 0.0394 0.0170 0.0482 -0.00768
(0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0671) (0.0608) (0.0427)
Age -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗ -0.0123∗ -0.0165∗∗ -0.0226∗∗∗
(0.00703) (0.00701) (0.00709) (0.00798) (0.00734)
Female 0.488∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.312∗ 0.159
(0.187) (0.187) (0.184) (0.185) (0.197)
Muslim 1.793∗∗∗
(0.264)
Nationalism -0.0382
(0.223)
N 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.2 Survey
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Instructions	to	enumerators:	
- If	not	otherwise	specified,	mark	only	one	answer	choice.	
- If	not	otherwise	specified,	do	not	read	out	the	answer	choices.	
- Anything	in	square	brackets	is	information	for	the	enumerator,	which	must	
not	be	read	out	lout.	
	
	
A. Section	A	
	
Let’s	start	with	a	few	questions	about	yourself.	
	
1. What	is	your	citizenship?	
a. Lebanese	
b. Other,	namely	__________	à	[If	other,	exclude	from	interview.	Say:	“Thank	
you	very	much	for	your	time.	This	time	around,	however,	we	only	want	
to	interview	Lebanese	citizens.”		
	
2. Gender	[Fill	in	gender	of	respondent]	
a. Male	
b. Female		
	
3. Housing	[Fill	in	the	type	of	housing	of	respondent]		
a. Camp	
b. Shared	apartment	
c. Separate	apartment	
d. Shared	house	
e. Separate	house		
f. Other,	_________	[Fill	in]	
	
4. How	old	are	you?	[Fill	in	years]	
a. _________	years		
	
5. What	is	your	highest	level	of	education?	[Read	out	answer	choices]	
a. No	formal	education	
b. Incomplete	primary	school	
c. Complete	primary	school	
d. Incomplete	secondary	
e. Complete	secondary	
f. Some	university-level	education,	without	degree	
g. University-level	education,	with	degree	
h. Other,	_________	[Fill	in]	
	
6. What	is	your	marital	status?		
a. Married	 	
b. In	a	relationship	
c. Divorced	
d. Separated	
e. Widowed	
f. Single	
	
7. How	many	children	do	you	have?		
a. _________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
8. What	is	your	primary	occupation?	[Read	out	answer	choices]	
a. Full	time	employee	(30	hours	a	week	or	more)	
b. Part	time	employee	(less	than	30	hours	a	week)	
c. Self-employed	/	owns	business	
d. Retired	
e. Housewife	/	houseman	
f. Student	
g. Unemployed	
h. Other,	namely	_________	[Fill	in]	
	
9. Which	of	the	following	best	describes	your	profession?	If	you	do	not	currently	
work,	characterize	your	major	work	in	the	past.	[Read	out	answer	choices]	
a. No	profession	
b. Agriculture	and	fishing	
c. Manufacturing	
d. Construction	
e. Trade	and	repair	
f. Hotels	and	restaurants	
g. Transport	and	communications	
h. Education	
i. Health	and	social	work	
j. Other,	namely	__________	[Fill	in]	
	
10. How	many	persons	live	in	your	household,	including	you?	
a. _________	[Fill	in	number]	
		
11. What	is	the	total	approximate	income	of	your	household	in	USD	each	month?		
a. _________	USD	
	
12. What	percentage	of	your	household	income	comes	from	money	transfers	from	
relatives	who	either	work	abroad	or	in	another	Lebanese	city?	
a. _________	%	
	
13. Where	were	you	born?	[Fill	in	country	and	city]	
a. Country:	_________	
b. City:	_________	
	
14. What	is	your	religion?	
a. Christian	Maronite	Catholic	
b. Christian	Greek	Orthodox	
c. Christian	Melkite	Catholic	
d. Christian	Armenian	Apostolic	
e. Muslim	Sunni	
f. Muslim	Shia	
g. Druze	
h. Atheist	/	Agnostic	/	No	belief	
i. Other,	namely	_________	[Fill	in]	
	
15. How	often	do	you	pray	during	a	given	week?	[Fill	in	number]	
a. _________		
	
16. How	important	is	religion	in	your	life?	
a. Very	important	
b. Important	
c. Neither	important,	nor	unimportant	
d. Unimportant	
e. Very	unimportant	
	
17. I’d	like	you	to	think	of	your	three	closest	neighbors.	Can	you	tell	me	their	
nationality?	
a. Neighbor	1	_________	[Fill	in	nationality]	
b. Neighbor	2	_________	[Fill	in	nationality]	
c. Neighbor	3	_________	[Fill	in	nationality]	
	
	
B. Section	B	
	
18. In	general,	how	willing	are	you	to	take	risks?	Please	use	a	scale	from	0	to	10,	
where	0	means	“completely	unwilling	to	take	risks”	and	a	10	means	“very	willing	
to	take	risks”.		
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
19. How	willing	are	you	to	give	up	something	today	in	order	to	get	more	in	the	
future?	Again,	indicate	your	answer	on	a	scale	from	0	to	10,	where	0	means	
“completely	unwilling	to	do	so”	and	a	10	means	you	“very	willing	to	do	so”.		
b. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
20. On	a	scale	from	0	(not	at	all)	to	10	(perfectly),	how	well	does	the	following	
statement	describe	you	as	a	person?	“As	long	as	I	am	not	convinced	otherwise,	I	
assume	that	people	have	only	the	best	intentions.”	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
[The	next	question	includes	several	random	elements.	In	total,	there	are	many	different	
versions	of	the	following	question.	Please	take	care	in	programming	this	question.	Please	
also	include	variables	that	note	which	words	respondents	were	assigned	to.]		
	
21. Now,	we	would	like	to	introduce	you	to	a	hypothetical	Syrian	refugee	named	
Mohamad.	Mohamad	is	24	years	old.	He	has	been	contemplating	whether	to	
migrate	toward	the	European	Union	to	apply	for	asylum.	Friends	told	Mohamad	
that	refugees	are	[randomize:	ostracized	/	welcomed]	in	Europe.	He	also	heard	
that	refugees	have	a	[randomize:	good	/	poor]	chance	of	gaining	full-time	
employment	in	the	EU.	His	friends	also	said	that	certain	European	countries	
have	recently	put	in	place	[randomize:	less	/	more]	strict	border	controls.	At	the	
same	time,	the	economic	situation	in	Mohamad’s	home	region	has	[randomize:	
deteriorated	/	improved].	Meanwhile,	the	security	situation	continues	to	be	
[randomize:	poor	/	good].	
	
Given	this	information,	what	would	you	advise	Mohamad	to	do?	[Read	out	
answer	choices]	
a. Definitely	not	migrate	
b. Probably	not	migrate	
c. Unsure	
d. Probably	migrate	
e. Definitely	migrate	
	
22. How	about	yourself,	on	a	scale	from	1	to	10,	how	likely	are	you	to	migrate	
elsewhere	in	the	coming	years?	1	means	very	unlikely,	while	10	means	very	
likely.	
a. ________	[Fill	in	number]		
	
23. And,	if	you	were	to	migrate,	what	could	country	would	you	like	to	go	to?	
a. ________	[Fill	in	country]		
	
	
	
C. Section	C	
	
[The	following	three	questions	should	only	be	asked	to	50%	of	all	Lebanese	respondents.	
It	should	be	randomized	whether	a	respondent	receives	these	three	questions	or	not.	
Please	take	care	in	programming	this	randomization.	Please	also	include	a	variable	that	
notes	whether	a	respondent	was	assigned	the	questions	or	not.]		
	
24. Currently,	Lebanon	is	hosting	over	one	million	refugees	from	Syria.	We'd	like	to	
ask	you	a	couple	of	questions	related	to	the	refugee	crisis.	How	have	you	and	
your	family	been	personally	affected	by	the	refugee	crisis?	[Read	out	answer	
choices]		
a. Positively	affected	
b. Neutrally	affected		
c. Negatively	affected	
	
25. How	do	you	think	Lebanon	as	a	whole	has	been	affected	by	the	refugee	crisis?	
[Read	out	answer	choices]		
a. Positively	affected	
b. Neutrally	affected		
c. Negatively	affected	
	
26. Do	you	support	Lebanon's	response	to	the	refugee	crisis?	[Read	out	answer	
choices]			
a. Yes,	absolutely	
b. Yes,	by	and	large	
c. No,	not	really	
d. No,	not	definitely	not	
	
[Next,	there	are	three	blocks	of	questions,	A,	B	and	C.	Each	block	includes	four	similar	(but	
not	identical)	sets	of	questions.	These	bocks	must	be	put	in	random	order.	That	is,	it	
should	be	randomized	whether	a	respondent	first	receives	Questions	27	–	30	and	then	
Questions	31	to	34	and	then	Questions	35	to	38	or	whether	the	ordering	will	be	different	
(e.g.,	first	Q31	to	34,	then	Q27	to	20	and	then	Q35	to	38).	Please	take	care	in	
programming	this	randomization.	Please	also	include	a	variable	that	notes	in	which	
order	the	blocks	were	asked.]		
	
Block	A	
	
Next,	I’d	like	you	to	think	of	the	following	situation:	You	and	a	Syrian	refugee	nearby	
named	Omar	both	participate	in	a	study.	You	do	not	know	Omar,	but	you	know	that	he	
is	a	35-year	refugee	from	Syria.	In	the	study,	you	and	Omar	will	be	asked	to	make	
choices	about	how	to	assign	a	certain	amount	of	money.	
	
27. Imagine	the	following	game.	Both	you	and	Omar	get	$10.	Next,	you	and	Omar	
have	to	give	any	amount	of	that	money	to	the	other	person.	You	decide	first.	
Omar	decides	second.	Importantly:	Each	Dollar	that	you	transfer	to	Omar,	the	
Syrian	refugee,	will	be	tripled	by	us	and	then	given	to	Omar.	That	means,	if	you	
give	$1	of	your	$10	to	Omar,	you	then	have	$9,	while	Omar	will	have	$10	plus	3	
times	$1,	so	$13.		Then,	Omar	can	decide	to	send	some	money	back	to	you.	Let’s	
now	play	this	game.	How	much	of	your	$10	do	you	give	to	Omar,	which	we	then	
triple?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
28. Next,	imagine	that	we	play	the	game	again.	Again,	both	you	and	Omar	get	$10.	
This	time,	Omar	decides	first	and	you	second.	Imagine	that	Omar,	the	Syrian	
refugee,	transfers	$3	of	his	$10	to	you.	That	means,	he	remains	with	$7,	while	
you	get	3	times	$3	(we	have	tripled	the	amount).	Overall,	you	end	up	with	your	
original	$10	plus	an	additional	$9,	so	$19	in	total.	Now,	it	is	your	turn	to	give	
money	back.	How	much	of	the	$19	would	you	transfer	back	to	Omar?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
29. Now,	we’d	like	to	play	a	different	game.	This	time,	you	get	$20.	You	are	then	
asked	to	give	any	amount	of	that	money	to	Omar,	the	Syrian	refugee.	This	will	
be	the	end	of	the	study.	You	will	remain	with	$20	minus	whatever	you	have	
given	to	Omar.	How	much	would	you	transfer	to	Omar?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
30. Finally,	we	would	like	to	play	another	game.	Imagine	you	and	Omar,	the	Syrian	
refugee,	both	simultaneously	have	to	choose	between	two	options,	Cooperate	or	
Not	Cooperate.	That	is,	when	you	choose	between	Cooperate	or	Not	Cooperate,	
you	do	not	know	what	Omar	has	chosen.	And	Omar	also	does	not	know	what	
you	have	chosen.	The	amount	you	and	Omar	are	paid	depends	on	both	of	your	
choices.		
1) If	you	choose	to	Not	Cooperate	and	Omar	also	does	Not	Cooperate,	you	
both	get	$5.		
2) If	you	choose	to	Cooperate	and	Omar	chooses	to	Cooperate,	you	each	
receive	$10.		
3) If	you	choose	to	Not	Cooperate	and	Omar	chooses	to	Cooperate,	then	you	
receive	$20	and	Omar	receives	$0.	
4) If	you	choose	to	Cooperate	and	Omar	chooses	to	Not	Cooperate,	then	you	
receive	$0	and	Omar	receives	$20.	
	
	 Would	you	choose	to	Cooperate	or	to	Not	Cooperate?		
a) Cooperate	
b) Not	Cooperate	
	
Block	B	
	
Imagine	the	following	situation:	You	and	a	Lebanese	individual	nearby	named	Rami	
both	participate	in	a	study.	You	do	not	know	Rami,	but	you	do	know	that	he	is	a	37-
year	old	Lebanese	citizen.	In	the	study,	you	and	Rami	will	be	asked	to	make	choices	
about	how	to	assign	a	certain	amount	of	money.	
	
31. Imagine	the	following	game.	Both	you	and	Rami	get	$10.	Next,	you	and	Rami	
have	to	give	any	amount	of	that	money	to	the	other	person.	You	decide	first.	
Rami	decides	second.	Importantly:	each	Dollar	that	you	transfer	to	Rami,	the	
Lebanese	citizen,	will	be	tripled	by	us	and	then	given	to	Rami.	That	means,	if	
you	give	$1	of	your	$10	to	Rami,	you	then	have	$9,	while	Rami	will	have	$10	
plus	3	times	$1,	so	$13.		Then,	Rami	can	decide	to	send	some	money	back	to	you.	
Let’s	now	play	this	game.	How	much	of	your	$10	do	you	give	to	Rami,	which	we	
then	triple?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
32. Next,	imagine	that	we	play	the	game	again.	Again,	both	you	and	Rami	get	$10.	
This	time,	Rami	decides	first	and	you	second.	Imagine	that	Rami,	the	Lebanese	
citizen,	transfers	$3	of	his	$10	to	you.	That	means,	he	remains	with	$7,	while	
you	get	3	times	$3	(we	have	tripled	the	amount).	Overall,	you	end	up	with	your	
original	$10	plus	an	additional	$9,	so	$19	in	total.	Now,	it	is	your	turn	to	give	
money	back.	How	much	of	the	$19	would	you	transfer	back	to	Rami?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
33. Now,	we’d	like	to	play	a	different	game.	This	time,	you	get	$20.	You	are	then	
asked	to	give	any	amount	of	that	money	to	Rami,	the	Lebanese	citizen.	This	will	
be	the	end	of	the	study.	You	will	remain	with	$20	minus	whatever	you	have	
given	to	Rami.	How	much	would	you	transfer	to	Rami?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
34. Finally,	we	would	like	to	play	another	game.	Imagine	you	and	Rami,	the	
Lebanese	citizen,	both	simultaneously	have	to	choose	between	two	options,	
Cooperate	or	Not	Cooperate.	That	is,	when	you	choose	between	Cooperate	or	Not	
Cooperate,	you	do	not	know	what	Rami	has	chosen.	And	Rami	also	does	not	
know	what	you	have	chosen.	The	amount	you	and	Rami	are	paid	depends	on	
both	your	choices.		
5) If	you	choose	to	Not	Cooperate	and	Rami	also	does	Not	Cooperate,	you	
both	get	$5.		
6) If	you	choose	to	Cooperate	and	Rami	chooses	to	Cooperate,	you	each	
receive	$10.		
7) If	you	choose	to	Not	Cooperate	and	Rami	chooses	to	Cooperate,	then	you	
receive	$20	and	Rami	receives	$0.	
8) If	you	choose	to	Cooperate	and	Rami	chooses	to	Not	Cooperate,	then	you	
receive	$0	and	Rami	receives	$20.	
	
	 Would	you	choose	to	Cooperate	or	to	Not	Cooperate?		
a) Cooperate	
b) Not	Cooperate	
	
Block	C	
	
Imagine	the	following	situation:	You	and	a	Palestinian	refugee	nearby	named	Adham	
both	participate	in	a	study.	You	do	not	know	Adham,	but	you	do	know	that	he	is	a	33-
year	old	Palestinian	refugee.	In	the	study,	you	and	Adham	will	be	asked	to	make	
choices	about	how	to	assign	a	certain	amount	of	money.	
	
35. Imagine	the	following	game.	Both	you	and	Adham	get	$10.	Next,	you	and	Adham	
have	to	give	any	amount	of	that	money	to	the	other	person.	You	decide	first.	
Adham	decides	second.	Importantly:	each	Dollar	that	you	transfer	to	Adham,	the	
Palestinian	refugee,	will	be	tripled	by	us	and	then	given	to	Adham.	That	means,	
if	you	give	$1	of	your	$10	to	Adham,	you	then	have	$9,	while	Adham	will	have	
$10	plus	3	times	$1,	so	$13.		Then,	Adham	can	decide	to	send	some	money	back	
to	you.	Let’s	now	play	this	game.	How	much	of	your	$10	do	you	give	to	Adham,	
which	we	then	triple?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
36. Next,	imagine	that	we	play	the	game	again.	Again,	both	you	and	Adham	get	$10.	
This	time,	Adham	decides	first	and	you	second.	Imagine	that	Adham,	the	
Palestinian	refugee,	transfers	$3	of	his	$10	to	you.	That	means,	he	remains	with	
$7,	while	you	get	3	times	$3	(we	have	tripled	the	amount).	Overall,	you	end	up	
with	your	original	$10	plus	an	additional	$9,	so	$19	in	total.	Now,	it	is	your	turn	
to	give	money	back.	How	much	of	the	$19	would	you	transfer	back	to	Adham?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
37. Now,	we’d	like	to	play	a	different	game.	This	time,	you	get	$20.	You	are	then	
asked	to	give	any	amount	of	that	money	to	Adham,	the	Palestinian	refugee,.	This	
will	be	the	end	of	the	study.	You	will	remain	with	$20	minus	whatever	you	have	
given	to	Adham.	How	much	would	you	transfer	to	Adham?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
38. Finally,	we	would	like	to	play	another	game.	Imagine	you	and	Adham,	the	
Palestinian	refugee,	both	simultaneously	have	to	choose	between	two	options,	
Cooperate	or	Not	Cooperate.	That	is,	when	you	choose	between	Cooperate	or	
Not	Cooperate,	you	do	not	know	what	Adham	has	chosen.	And	Adham	also	does	
not	know	what	you	have	chosen.	The	amount	you	and	Adham	are	paid	depends	
on	both	your	choices.		
9) If	you	choose	to	Not	Cooperate	and	Adham	also	does	Not	Cooperate,	you	
both	get	$5.		
10) If	you	choose	to	Cooperate	and	Adham	chooses	to	Cooperate,	you	each	
receive	$10.		
11) If	you	choose	to	Not	Cooperate	and	Adham	chooses	to	Cooperate,	then	
you	receive	$20	and	Adham	receives	$0.	
12) If	you	choose	to	Cooperate	and	Adham	chooses	to	Not	Cooperate,	then	
you	receive	$0	and	Adham	receives	$20.	
	
	 Would	you	choose	to	Cooperate	or	to	Not	Cooperate?		
a) Cooperate	
b) Not	Cooperate	
	
D. Section	D	
	
39. In	your	view,	to	what	extent	are	the	following	resources	scarce	in	this	
neighborhood?	Please	rate	it	from	0	(not	scarce	at	all)	to	10	(very	scarce).	[Fill	
in	numbers]	
a. Water:	____________	
b. Electricity:	____________	
c. Food:	____________	
d. Supplies:	____________	
e. Clothing:	____________	
	
40. In	the	last	month,	how	many	Syrian	and	Lebanese	individuals	have	you	
interacted	with.	This	does	not	include	your	family	or	friends.	[Fill	in	numbers]	
a. Syrians:	____________	
b. Lebanese:	____________	
	
41. We	have	spoken	to	many	people	in	this	area	and	they	have	all	described	
themselves	in	different	ways.	Some	people	describe	themselves	in	terms	of	their	
religion	or	nationality.	Others	describe	themselves	in	economic	terms,	such	as	
working	class,	middle	class,	or	a	farmer.	Which	specific	group	do	you	feel	you	
belong	to	first	and	foremost?	[Read	out	answer	choices]	
a. Nationality	
b. Religion	
c. Class	
	
42. On	a	scale	from	0	to	100,	where	0	means	(very	cold)	and	100	means	(very	
warm),	how	warm	or	cold	do	you	feel	toward	Syrian	refugees?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
43. Lebanon	has	seen	migrants	come	from	many	countries.	Two	big	groups	are	
Syrians	and	Palestinians.	To	what	extent	do	you	think	these	two	groups	are	
similar	or	different?	Please	answer	on	a	scale	from	0	(very	similar)	to	10	(very	
different).	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
44. Last,	would	you	be	happy	to	give	us	your	phone	number	so	that	we	can	stay	in	
touch	with	you?	
a. ____________	[Fill	in	number]	
	
	
Thank	you	very	much	for	agreeing	to	participate	in	this	survey.	Your	participation	
means	a	lot	to	us!	
	
[End	of	survey]	
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